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Not Guilty-But Not Innocent: An Analysis 
of the Acquittal of John Demjanjuk and Its 
Impact on the Future of Nazi War Crimes 
Trials 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 29, 1993, the Supreme Court of the State of Israel acquit-
ted John Demjanjuk of charges that he was "Ivan the Terrible," a 
sadistic Nazi gas chamber operator who assisted in the extermina-
tion of thousands of Jews at the Treblinka death camp in Poland 
during World War II.! The acquittal, which overturned the district 
court's 1988 conviction and death sentence,2 was based on new 
evidence which created a "reasonable doubt" that Demjanjuk was 
"Ivan the Terrible" of Treblinka.3 
The acquittal of John Demjanjuk comes after a sixteen year legal 
battle which began in the United States in 1977, when the U.S. 
government instituted denaturalization proceedings against Demjan-
juk for misrepresentations made on his visa application.4 The United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio revoked 
Demjanjuk's certificate of naturalization after finding that he had 
lied about his wartime activities on his visa application.5 In Novem-
ber 1983, while a deportation hearing was pending, the Israeli gov-
ernment requested Demjanjuk's extradition.6 This request marked 
1 Chris Hedges, Israel Court Sets Demjanjuk Free, But He Is Now Without a Country, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 1993, at AI. Historians estimate that over 800,000 people were murdered at 
the Treblinka death camp. L. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945 149 
(1975). 
2 THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL (Asher Felix Landau ed. & Hever Translators Pool, trans., Israel 
Bar Publishing House) (1991). 
3 The Final Chapter of the Verdict of the High Court of Justice Regarding John Demjanjuk 
Detailing the Considerations and the Conclusions Which Led to the Judges' Decision (Israeli Info. 
Ctr.,Jerusalem, Isr.) July 27,1993, at 20 [hereinafter Final Chapterl. 
4 United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1363 (N.D. Ohio 1981), ajJ'd per curiam, 
680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982); Israel: Demjanjuk Ruling Caps 16-Year 
LegalFight, REUTERS, Sept. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File [herein-
after 16-Year Fightl. 
5 United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1386. 
6 Rena Hozore Reiss, The Extradition of John Demjanjuk: War Crimes, Universality Jurisdiction, 
and the Political Offense Doctrine, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 281, 289 (1987). 
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the first time ever that Israel had sought the extradition of a sus-
pected Nazi war criminal from the United States.7 In 1985, after a 
year and a half of litigation, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio entered an order certifying to the Secre-
tary of State that Demjanjuk was subject to extradition pursuant to 
the Extradition Treaty between the United States and IsraeLB The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed this order, and on February 28, 1986, Demjan-
juk was extradited to Israel to stand tria1.9 
On April 18, 1988, after a fourteen month trial, the District Court 
of Jerusalem convicted Demjanjuk on charges of being Ivan the 
Terrible and sentenced him to death by hanging.lo Demjanjuk ap-
pealed the court's decision and its sentence, maintaining, as he had 
from the start, that he was a victim of mistaken identityY Demjan-
juk's appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court began on May 14, 1990, 
more than two years after the district court's decisionP Demjanjuk 
remained in solitary confinement in a cell near Tel Aviv for five years 
awaiting a ruling on his appealP 
In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders 
released evidence from the Soviet archives which identified another 
man, Ivan Marchenko, as the gas chamber operator known as Ivan 
the Terrible. 14 During his appeal, Demjanjuk submitted applications 
to the Israeli Supreme Court for the admission of this new evidence.15 
The court admitted the evidence and onJuly 29, 1993, based on the 
7 Steven Lubet & Jan Stern Reed, Extradition of Nazis from the United States to Israel: A Survey 
of Issues in Transnational Criminal Law, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1986). 
8 In reo Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 571 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd sub nom. 
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lubet 
& Reed, supra note 7, at 3. 
9 J6-Year Fight, supra note 4. 
10 THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 385-86; J6-Year Fight, supra note 4. 
II Clyde Haberman, Israeli Court Clears Way to Deporting Demjanjuk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 
1993, at A3 [hereinafter Haberman, Court Clears Way]; Asher Felix Landau, Free: By Reason 
of Reasonable Doubt, JERUSALEM POST, July 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News 
File [hereinafter Landau, Free]. 
12 TOM TEICHOLZ, THE TRIAL OF IVAN THE TERRIBLE 302 (1990). 
13 Howard Goller, Israel: Demjanjuk Free But Still a Mystery, REUTERS, Sept. 19, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File. 
14 Ralph Blumenthal, Nazi Hunters Look Beyond Demjanjuk, N.V. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1993, § 4, 
at 5. 
15 Landau, Free, supra note 11. The new evidence was allowed in pursuant to § 15 of the 
Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, which states, in relevant part, "the court may 
deviate from the rules of evidence if it is satisfied that this will promote the ascertainment of 
the truth and the just handling of the case." Id.; Law of Aug. 1,5710-1950 [1950] 4 Laws of 
the State ofIsraei No. 64, at 157 [hereinafter Nazi Statute]. 
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reasonable doubt the evidence created, acquitted Demjanjuk of all 
charges.16 The court did find, however, that Demjanjuk had served as 
a Schutzstaffel (S.S.) Wachmann (guardsman) in the Trawniki unit 
where he aided in the murder of thousands ofJewsY The court also 
found that Demjanjuk had served at the Sobibor death camp in 
Poland. IS Despite these findings, the Supreme Court of Israel de-
clined to convict Demjanjuk on the Trawniki and Sobibor crimes or 
to remit the case to the district court for further inquiry.19 
Following the Israeli Supreme Court's ruling, a group of Holo-
caust survivors filed petitions to the court demanding that new 
criminal proceedings be brought against Demjanjuk based on the 
Trawniki and Sobibor evidence.2o The Attorney General of Israel 
rejected these petitions.21 The Supreme Court ofIsrael, sitting as the 
High Court of Justice, exercised judicial review of the Attorney 
General's decision and upheld his decision not to bring new charges 
against De~anjuk.22 Following Demjanjuk's acquittal, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reopened Demjanjuk's 
extradition case and issued a writ of habeas corpus enabling Demjanjuk 
to return to the United States.23 Demjanjuk's re-entry into the United 
16 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 19-20; 16-Year Fight, supra note 4. 
17 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 20, 26. In 1941, the German government set up the 
Trawniki training camp in Poland. THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 4. The camp was 
established to train and instruct Soviet prisoners-of-war taken from the Rovno and Chelm 
camps in the duties of the S.S. Id. Upon completion of their training they were inducted into 
the German army and took an oath of allegiance to serve with the German S.S. forces as 
Wachmanns. Id. 
18 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 20, 34. Sobibor, along with Treblinka and Belzac, consti-
tuted the three camps which formed "Action Reinhardt." U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 
1364-65. Action Reinhardt was the code word used by the Nazi regime for its plan to 
systematically exterminate allJews from those European countries occupied by German forces. 
Id. at 1364. Three extermination camps, Belzac, Sobibor, and Treblinka, were constructed to 
implement the mass annihilation conceived by Action Reinhardt. Id. at 1364-65. The German 
S.S. lacked sufficient manpower to carry out all the tasks of Action Reinhardt and, conse-
quently, recruited Russian prisoners-of-war, mainly Ukrainians, to assist in the operation. Id. 
at 1965. Action Reinhardt ended in the late fall of 1943 when prisoners of the Sobibor and 
Treblinka camps revolted. Id. Following the uprisings, the German S.S. dismantled and 
camouflaged the camps, and exterminated all the remaining Jews. THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, 
supra note 2, at 5. The S.S. plowed the site of the Treblinka camp and established an 
agricultural farm on its grounds. Id. 
19 See Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 39-40. 
20 Clyde Haberman, Israeli Court Rules for Demjanjuk But He Stays in jail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
19, 1993, at A8 [hereinafter Haberman, Stays In jail]. 
21Id. 
22 Asher Felix Landau, The End of the Demjanjuk Case, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 20, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File [hereinafter Landau, The End]. 
23 See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20596, at *1. (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 1993). 
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States marked the first time ever that a convicted Nazi war criminal, 
ejected from the United States, was permitted to return.24 On No-
vember 17, 1993, after finding that the Justice Department's Office 
of Special Investigations (OSI) had committed prosecutorial miscon-
duct by withholding exculpatory information from Demjanjuk dur-
ing his extradition hearings, the Sixth Circuit revoked Demjanjuk's 
extradition order.25 On October 3, 1994, the United States Supreme 
Court denied review of the Sixth Circuit's decision.26 Demjanjuk is 
now free once again, living in Ohio. 
The trial of John Demjanjuk may well mark the last major trial of 
a suspected Nazi war criminal. It is unlikely that individual nations, 
already reluctant to expend the time and money needed to bring 
war criminals to justice, will request the extradition of suspected 
Nazi perpetrators after the Demjanjuk decision. Unfortunately, this 
reluctance comes at a time when access to previously sealed infor-
mation about Nazi war criminals is more abundant than ever.27 In 
the end, the lesson of the Demjanjuk case may be that it is extraor-
dinarily difficult to bring to justice the perpetrators of the Holo-
caust. 
Part I of this note briefly looks at the case history, including the 
denaturalization and extradition proceedings in the United States. 
Part II of this note examines Israel's basis for jurisdiction under both 
municipal and international law. Part III focuses on the 1988 trial 
before the District Court of Jerusalem in which Demjanjuk was 
found guilty and sentenced to death. Part IV examines Demjanjuk's 
acquittal by the Israeli Supreme Court and Israel's decision not to 
retry Demjanjuk for other war crimes. Part V briefly looks at the 
reopening of Demjanjuk's extradition case in the United States. 
Finally, Part VI of this note analyzes the Israeli Supreme Court's 
decision and explores the future of Nazi war crimes trials after the 
Demjanjuk decision. 
24 Stephen Labaton, No Review of Court Ruling That Let Demjanjuk Return, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
4, 1994, at A18. 
25 See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Marc]. Hertzberg, 
Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals: A Call for the Immediate Prosecution of Living Nazi War 
Criminals, 5 MD.]. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 181, 181 n.2 (1993/1994) (book review). 
26 David Arnold, Demjanjuk Veteran Sees Strong Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 22, 1994, at AI. 
27 Tom Brazaitis, A Decision, Not An Ending, THE PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 1, 1993, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of 
Soviet archives, detailed records of Nazi atrocities are now available to the international 
community. Id. 
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1. BACKGROUND 
John Demjanjuk, a native of the Ukraine, was conscripted into the 
Soviet Army in 1940, and shortly thereafter was captured by German 
forces. 28 In 1942, after spending short periods of time in German 
prisoner-of-war camps, Demjanjuk was recruited by the German 
S.S.29 Demjanjuk was then transferred to Trawniki, Poland, where he 
received an identification card and was trained to fulfill duties in 
the framework of Operation Reinhardt.30 
It is alleged that in the fall of 1942, Demjanjuk was sent to work 
at the Treblinka death camp in Poland, where he operated the gas 
chambers which killed thousands ofJewsY The savage cruelty of this 
gas chamber operator earned him the nickname "Ivan Grozny" or 
"Ivan the Terrible. "32 In 1948, after completion of his service in the 
German army, Demjanjuk applied for immigration to the United 
States.33 In his visa applications, Demjanjuk misrepresented his place 
of residence during the period 1937-1948 and failed to disclose his 
employment by the German S.S. during the war.34 In 1952, based on 
this false information, Demjanjuk was able to enter the United States 
as a lawful permanent resident pursuant to the Displaced Persons 
Act (DPA) .35 In 1958, he became a U.S. citizen and changed his first 
name from Ivan to John.36 Since his arrival in the United States, he 
has resided in Cleveland, OhioY 
In 1977, twenty-five years after his admission to the United States, 
the U.S. government brought charges against Demjanjuk for illegal 
procurement of his citizenship.38 Specifically, the government charged 
28 U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1363-64. 
29 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 
(1986). 
30 U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1365,1369. 
31 [d. at 1369-70. 
32 [d. at 1370. 
33 [d. at 1379. 
34 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 575. 
35 U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1363; see also Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. 
No. 774, 62 Stat. 1009, 1014 (1948), as amended I7y the Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 555, 64 Stat. 
219,227 (1950) [hereinafter DPA]. In 1948, Congress passed the DPA, which allowed for the 
admittance of 202,000 "eligible displaced persons" into the United States between June 30, 
1948 and July 1, 1950. [d. at § 3. The DPA was enacted to enable European refugees driven 
from their homeland to emigrate to the United States. U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 
1378. 
36 [d. at 1380. 
37 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 575. 
38 See 16-Year Fight, supra note 4. 
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that Demjanjuk's wartime activities precluded him from entering the 
United States as a displaced person under the DPA.39 The govern-
ment also claimed that Demjanjuk's visa was invalid because he had 
willfully misrepresented his service in the German military.40 
A. Denaturalization Hearings 
In order to denaturalize an alleged war criminal, the government 
must prove that the individual in question has obtained entry into 
the United States illegally or by willfully making a misrepresentation 
of a material factY The Supreme Court of the United States has 
interpreted "material misrepresentations" as facts which, if disclosed 
at the time of entry, would have made an applicant ineligible for a 
visa under the DPA.42 In Fedorenko v. United States, the Supreme 
Court held that the failure to disclose the true facts about service as 
an armed guard in the German S.S. would have made the petitioner 
ineligible for a visa under the DPA.43 As a result, the Court in 
Fedorenko found that petitioner'S false statements about his wartime 
activities were "willful and material misrepresentations" and, there-
fore, his visa had to be revoked as illegally procured.44 
On June 23,1981, the District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio found that Demjanjuk had served the German S.S. as a guard 
at both Trawniki and Treblinka during 1942-1943 and he had will-
fully misrepresented that service on his visa application.45 During his 
denaturalization proceedings, Demjanjuk admitted to falsifying state-
39 U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1363. In 1950, § 13 of the DPA was amended to state: 
"No visa shall be issued ... to any person who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any 
person because of race, religion, or national origin, or to any person who has voluntarily 
borne arms against the United States during World War II." DPA, supra note 35, § 13. 
40 U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1363. Demjanjuk stated on his visa application that 
from 1936-1943 he worked as a farmer in Sobibor, Poland, and from 1943-1944, at the harbor 
in Denzig, Germany. [d. at 1379. Demjanjuk admitted at the denaturalization proceedings 
that these statements were false. [d. 
41 [d. at 1380. Section 1451 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act requires revocation 
of United States citizenship that was "illegally procured ... by concealment of a material fact 
or by willful misrepresentation." Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1451 (a) 
(1982). 
42 Fedorenko v. U.S., 449 U.S. 480, 509 (1981). 
43 [d. Fedorenko's failure to reveal his service as an armed guard at Treblinka was found to 
be material since, under § 2(b) of the DPA, any individual who "assisted the enemy in 
persecuting civilians" was ineligible for a visa. [d., citing DPA, supra note 35, § 2b. 
44 [d. at 514. Fedorenko was charged with serving as an armed guard at the Treblinka death 
camp from 1942 to 1943. [d. at 494. He obtained entry into the United States under the DPA 
by falsitying the information on his visa application. Fedorenko v. U.S., 449 U.S. at 496. 
Fedorenko was naturalized in 1969 at which time he once again failed to disclose his wartime 
service as a concentration camp guard. [d. at 497. 
45 U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1381. 
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ments concerning his residence on his visa application.46 He also 
admitted to serving as a German soldier, but denied any association 
with the S.S. or with the Treblinka death camp.47 
De~anjuk's assertions were directly contradicted by documen-
tary evidence which identified him as a member of the S.S., and by 
eyewitness testimony which placed him at Treblinka during the years 
in question.48 The strongest piece of documentary evidence against 
Demjanjuk was the "Trawniki card," an identification card obtained 
from the archives of the former Soviet Union, which identified 
Demjanjuk as a member of the German S.S.49 The card contained a 
photograph, allegedly of Demjanjuk, and personal information such 
as Demjanjuk's name, date of birth, family history, personal charac-
teristics, and army assignments.5o Despite Demjanjuk's claims that 
the card was a forgery, the district court held that the card was 
authentic, the picture was of Demjanjuk, and the card clearly proved 
Demjanjuk's presence at the S.S. training camp at Trawniki.51 The 
government also produced six eyewitnesses from Treblinka, five 
Jewish prisoners and one German guard, who identified Demjanjuk 
as the man they knew as Ivan the Terrible, the gas chamber operator 
at Treblinka.52 The court found the identifications reliable.53 Relying 
on the Supreme Court's opinion in Fedorenko, the district court held 
De~anjuk's disclosure of his service in the Nazi S.S. would have 
made him ineligible for a visa, and therefore, his citizenship had to 
be revoked. 54 Alternatively, the court held De~anjuk's certificate of 
46 [d. at 1379. The court rejected Demjanjuk's argument that he lied on his visa application 
because he was afraid of repatriation to the Soviet Union. [d. at 1382. A similar defense was 
used by Fedorenko in his denaturalization proceedings, and also was rejected by the Fifth 
Circuit. U.S. v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 946, 953, reh'g denied, U.S. v. Fedorenko, 601 F.2d 1195 
(5th Cir. 1979), aft'd, Fedorenko v. U.S., 449 U.S. 480 (1981). The Supreme Court, in the 
Fedorenko case, although not directly addressing the issue, opined that the fact that Fe-
dorenko gave false statements because he was motivated by fear of repatriation "indicates that 
he understood that disclosing the truth would have affected his chances of being admitted to 
the United States and confirms that his misrepresentations were willful." Fedorenko v. U.S., 
449 U.S. at 507 n.26. 
47 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d. at 575. 
48 U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1365, 1369. 
49 [d. at 1365-66. The 'Trawniki card" is an identification card clearly stating that "Iwan 
Demjanjuk is employed as a guard in the Guard Units (Wachmannschaften) of the Reich 
Leader of the S.S. for the Establishment of S.S. and Police Headquarters in the New Eastern 
Territory." [d. at 1366. The card also states in boldface printing: "HEADQUARTERS LUBLIN, 
TRAINING CAMP TRAWNIKI, I.D. No. 1393." [d. 
50 [d. at 1366. 
51 [d. at 1368. 
52 U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1369-73. 
53 [d. at 1375. 
54 [d. at 1381-82. 
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naturalization had to be canceled under 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (a) because 
it was procured by "concealment of a material fact [and] by willful 
misrepresentation. "55 
Eighteen months later, in 1982, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
district court's decision denaturalizing Demjanjuk.56 The Supreme 
Court then denied Demjanjuk's petition for certiorari.57 Soon after, 
the government instituted deportation proceedings.58 While the de-
portation hearing was pending, the State of Israel filed a request for 
the extradition of Demjanjuk in accordance with the U.S. statute 
governing American extradition procedures.59 This request marked 
the first time Israel had asked the United States to turn over an 
alleged Nazi war crimina1.60 Acting on behalf of the State of Israel, 
the U.S. Attorney General for the Northern District of Ohio filed a 
complaint in the district court seeking the arrest of Demjanjuk and 
a hearing on the extradition request.61 
B. The Extradition Proceedings 
In order for the United States to extradite an individual to a 
foreign nation, a valid extradition treaty must exist between the 
United States and the requesting nation.62 If a valid treaty exists, the 
55 [d. at 1382-83. 
56 United States v. Demjanjuk, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, Demjanjuk v. U.S., 459 
U.S. 1036 (1982). 
57 Demjanjuk v. United States, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982). 
58 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 575. 
59 [d. at 575,580, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982) which states: 
[Wlhenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States 
or any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any magis-
trate authorized to do so by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court of 
record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath, 
charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the 
jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such 
treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so 
charged, that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate, to the 
end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. If, on such 
hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions 
of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy 
of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may 
issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government, for 
the surrender of such person, according to the stipulation of the treaty or conven-
tion; and he shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to 
the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be made. 
60 Reiss, supra note 6, at 281 n.51. 
61 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 575. 
62 See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982). 
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extradition court examines several factors to determine whether the 
individual is extraditable under U.S.law.53 The extradition court first 
must determine whether the person before the court is the same 
individual who is charged in the requesting country.54 Next, the 
court must certify that the offenses charged constitute extraditable 
offenses under the provisions of the applicable treaty.55 Finally, the 
extradition court must determine whether there exists probable 
cause to believe that the accused committed the offenses charged.55 
It is not the function of the extradition court to ascertain the guilt 
or innocence of the accused.57 Rather, the ultimate decision of guilt 
or innocence lies with the judiciary of the requesting nation.58 
Israel's request for Demjanjuk's extradition was made pursuant to 
the United States-Israel Extradition Treaty (Extradition Treaty) .59 
The validity of the Extradition Treaty was not in dispute, and there-
fore, the extradition court began by examining the question of 
identity.7o The issue of whether Demjanjuk was the person named in 
Israel's complaint became a contested issue throughout both the 
extradition and denaturalization proceedings due to Derrtianjuk's 
repeated denials that he was Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka. 71 Despite 
63 In reo Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 547. 
64Id. 
65Id. 
66Id. at 563. Once an extradition court finds probable cause, the decision regarding 
whether to extradite an individual to a foreign nation lies with the Secretary of State. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3184. 
67 In reo Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 563. 
68Id. 
69Id. at 546; Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United States-Israel, 14 U.S.T. 
1708, T.I.A.S. No. 5476 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty]. The Extradition Treaty states, in 
pertinen t part: 
Id. 
Article I: Each contracting Party agrees, under the conditions and circumstances 
established by the present Convention, reciprocally to deliver up persons found in 
its territory who have been charged with or convicted of any of the offenses men-
tioned in Article II of the present Convention committed within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the other, or outside thereof under the conditions specified in Article 
III of the present Convention. 
Article II: Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of the present 
Convention for prosecution when they have been charged with, or to undergo 
sentence when they have been convicted of, any of the following offenses: 
1. murder. 
2. manslaughter. 
3. malicious wounding; inflicting grievous bodily harm. 
70 In reo Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 547. 
71 See id. at 547; U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1376. 
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these denials, the district court found probable cause to believe 
Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible. 72 The court based its finding on 
eyewitness affidavits, submitted by the government, which identified 
photographs of Demjanjuk as Ivan the Terrible.73 These identifica-
tions were held sufficient to identify Demjanjuk as the individual 
sought by Israel, and, therefore, the court did not rely on the Trawniki 
card to prove Demjanjuk's identity.74 This precluded Demjanjuk from 
challenging the card's authenticity for a second time. 75 
The extradition court then dealt with the question of whether the 
crimes with which Demjanjuk was charged were extraditable of-
fenses under the Extradition Treaty.76 Israel's extradition request 
charged Demjanjuk with murder, manslaughter, and malicious wound-
ing.77 Israel's arrest warrant set forth the charges attributed to Demjan-
juk as follows: 
The suspect, nicknamed "Ivan the Terrible" was a member 
of the 5.5. and in the years 1942-1943 operated the gas 
chambers to exterminate prisoners at the Treblinka death 
camp in the Lublin area of Poland, which was operated by 
the Nazis during the Second World War. The suspect mur-
dered tens of thousands of Jews , as well as non:Jews, killing 
them, injuring them, causing them serious bodily and men-
tal harm and subjected them to living conditions calculated 
to bring about their physical destruction. The suspect com-
mitted these acts with the intention of destroying the Jew-
ish people and to commit crimes against humanity.78 
Article II of the Extradition Treaty includes, in its list of extradi-
table offenses, murder, manslaughter, and malicious wounding.79 
Reasoning that taking part in the murder of thousands of Jews and 
non:Jews clearly fell within the Extradition Treaty's definition of 
murder, the court concluded that Demjanjuk was extraditable under 
the terms of the Treaty.80 
72 In re: Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 547. 
73Id. at 552. 
74Id. at 553. 
75 See id. Demjanjuk had previously challenged the card's authenticity at his denaturalization 
hearing, where he argued the card was forged by the KGB. U.S. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 
at 1366. 
76 In re: Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 554. 
77Id. at 560. 
78Id. 
79 See Extradition Treaty, supra note 69, art. II, 14 U.S.T. at 1708. 
80 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 579. Article II of the Treaty lists murder as an 
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Following the hearing, the district court entered an order certify-
ing to the Secretary of State that Demjanjuk was subject to extradi-
tion pursuant to the Extradition Treaty.81 As a result of this order, 
bond, which had previously been granted to Demjanjuk, was re-
voked, and he was committed to the custody of the u.S. Attorney 
General pending the issuance of a warrant of surrender by the 
Secretary of State.82 Subsequent to this order, Demjanjuk unsuccess-
fully brought habeas corpus proceedings in the United States Dis-
trict Court.83 He then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit, challenging the district court's decision, inter 
alia, on the grounds that Israel lacked jurisdiction to try Demjanjuk.84 
II. ISRAELI JURISDICTION 
To honor an extradition request, the requesting state must have 
jurisdiction over the offense.85 The issue of Israel's jurisdiction over 
Demjanjuk was the most controversial aspect of the case.86 Demjan-
juk relied on two facts to contest Israel's power to exert jurisdiction 
over him.87 First, he claimed that he was not a citizen or a resident 
of the State of Israel, and secondly, that the crimes with which he 
was charged took place in Poland.88 The Sixth Circuit rejected both 
of these claims, stating that under both the terms of the Extradition 
Treaty and accepted principles of international law, Israel had juris-
diction to try Demjanjuk. "89 
extraditable offense. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 69, art. II, 14 V.S.T. at 1708. DeIJtianjuk 
alleged that murdering thousands of Jews was not covered by the Treaty's designation of 
murder. Demja~uk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 579. 
8l In re: Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 57l. 
82Id. 
83Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 612 F. Supp. 571, 578 (N.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, Demja~uk v. 
Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. Ohio 1985), cert. denied, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 475 V.S. 
1016. The court rejected Demjanjuk's habeas corpus claims and upheld the order of extradi-
tion.Id. 
84 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 579. Demja~uk also unsuccessfully challenged the 
district court's ruling on the grounds that insufficient evidence existed to warrant a finding 
of probable cause that he was guilty of the crimes charged, and that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the request for extradition because the crimes he was charged with 
were not included within the Treaty. Id. at 57~79. 
85 M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 203-04 
(1974) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION] (international extradition requires a threshold 
finding that the requesting state has jurisdiction over the offense). 
86 Reiss, supra note 6, at 298. 
87 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 580. 
88Id. 
89Id. at 582-83; see also Francis R. Strauss, Note, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky: An Analysis of 
Extradition, 12 MD.]' INT'L L. & TRADE 65, 72 (1987). 
148 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVIII, No.1 
Article III of the Extradition Treaty provides: ''when the offense 
has been committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the re-
questing Party, extradition need not be granted unless the laws of 
the requested Party provide for the punishment of such an offense 
committed in similar circumstances. "90 The court recognized in this 
language an implicit right to request extradition for "extraterrito-
rial" crimes.9! Furthermore, under principles of international law, 
the citizenship of the accused is not a controlling factor in extradi-
tion, and therefore, the court held that Demjanjuk's lack of Israeli 
citizenship did not bar Israel from exerting jurisdiction.92 Mter ex-
amining U.S. extradition laws and international principles, the Sixth 
Circuit held that jurisdiction over Demjanjuk was proper under both 
Israeli municipal law and internationallaw.93 
A. jurisdiction Under Municipal Law 
The district court found that Israel had jurisdiction to prosecute 
Demjanjuk under Israeli law.94 In 1950, Israel enacted the Nazis and 
Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law (Nazi Statute).95 Under this 
law, any person found to have committed crimes against the Jewish 
people,96 crimes against humanity,97 or war crimes,98 in an enemy 
90 Extradition Treaty, supra note 69, art. III, 14 U.s.T. at 1709. 
91 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 581; see also Strauss, supra note 89, at 72. Demjanjuk 
argued that the "need not" language of article III prohibited his extradition because there 
are no provisions for the punishment of war crimes or crimes against humanity under U.S. 
laws. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 580-81. The court rejected this argument and 
interpreted the language to mean that the requested nation has the discretion to deny 
extradition if its own laws do not provide for the punishment of the offense. Id. at 581. 
92 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 582; see discussion infra part II.B on universal 
jurisdiction, an international principle on which this is based. 
93 In re: Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 554. 
94 Id. at 555. 
95 Nazi Statute, supra note 15. 
96 The statute defines crimes against the Jewish people as any of the following acts: 
(l) killing Jews; 
(2) causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to Jews; 
(3) placing Jews in living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruc-
tion; 
(4) imposing measures intended to prevent births among Jews; 
(5) forcibly transferring Jewish children to another national or religious group; 
(6) destroying or desecrating Jewish religious or cultural assets or values; 
(7) inciting hatred of Jews. 
Id. at § 1. 
97 "Crimes against humanity" means any of the following acts: murder, extermination, 
enslavement, starvation or deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any 
civilian population, and persecution on national, racial, religious or political grounds. Id. 
98 "War crimes" means any of the following acts: murder, ill-treatment or deportation to 
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country99 during the period of the Nazi regimelOO is subject to the 
death penalty.lOl 
The Nazi Statute's definitions of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity are consistent with the corresponding definitions con-
tained in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) 
at Nuremberg. 102 Similarly, the statute's definition of crimes against 
Jewish people is based on the definition of genocide found in the 
Convention For the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.103 
forced labor or for any other purpose, of civilian population of or in occupied territory; 
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners ofwar or persons on the seas; killing of hostages; plunder 
of public or private property; wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages; and devastation 
not justified by military necessity. Id. 
99 "Enemy country" means: 
(a) Germany during the period of the Nazi regime; 
(b) any other Axis state during the period of the war between it [the Axis power] 
and the Allied powers; 
(c) any country which, during the whole or part of the period of the Nazi regime, 
was de facto under German rule, for the time during which it was de facto under 
German rule as aforesaid; 
(d) any territory which was de facto under the rule of any other Axis state during 
the whole or part of the period of the war between it and the Allied powers, for the 
time during which that territory was de facto under the rule of that Axis state as 
aforesaid. 
!d. at § 16. 
100The "period of the Nazi regime" means the period from January 30,1933 to May 8,1945. 
Nazi Statute, supra note 15, § 16. 
101Id. at § 1. 
102 The International Military Tribunal Charter, 59 Stat. 1555, 1556 [hereinafter IMT Char-
ter]. 
Id. 
The following acts ... are crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which 
there shall be individual responsibility: 
(a) crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a 
war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment 
of any of the foregoing; 
(b) war crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations 
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave 
labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, 
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, 
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, 
or devastation not justified by military necessity; 
(c) crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, depor-
tation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before 
or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execu-
tion of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 
103 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,1948, 
78 V.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. In 1950, Israel enacted the Crime of 
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Israel first asserted its right to try accused Nazi war criminals 
under the Nazi Statute in 1961 during the trial of Adolph Eich-
mann.l°4 Eichmann served as chief of the Gestapo's Jewish Section, 
where his responsibilities included the persecution, deportation, 
and extermination of hundreds of thousands of Jews and non:Jews 
in Germany.105 Eichmann was abducted from Argentina in 1960 and 
brought to trial in Jerusalem in 1961.106 
Eichmann was charged with fifteen counts under the Nazi Stat-
ute.107 His offenses fell into four main categories: crimes against the 
Jewish people, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and member-
ship in hostile organizations. lOB The District Court of Jerusalem con-
victed Eichmann on all counts and sentenced him to death. lOg On 
May 31, 1962, after an unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Israel and denial of his plea for clemency by the President of Israel, 
Eichmann was hanged yo 
The District Court of Israel based its jurisdiction to try Eichmann 
on the Nazi Statute, stating: 
Our jurisdiction to try this case is based on the Nazis and 
Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, a statutory law the 
provisions of which are unequivocal. The Court has to give 
effect to the law of the Knesset, III and we cannot entertain 
the contention that such a law conflicts with the principles 
of internationallaw. ll2 
In affirming the district court's decision, the Supreme Court of 
Israel noted that the Nazi Statute was an "extraordinary measure" 
designed to cope with an "extraordinaryevent:"ll3 
Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law, to give effect to the Genocide Convention. Law 
of Mar. 29, 5710-1950, [1950] 4 Laws ofthe State ofIsrael No. 31, at 101. Demjanjuk was not 
tried under this statute because it is not retroactive. See George R. Parsons, Jr., Note, Interna-
tional Law: Jurisdidion Over Extraterritorial Crime: Universality Principle, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 
326,334 (1960-61). 
104 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 25 (lsr. Dist. Ct.-Jerusalem 1961), 
aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962). An unofficial translation of the district court opinion 
prepared by the Israeli government is available at 56 AM.J. INT'L L. 805 (1962); see Keith C. 
Randell, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785, 810 (1988). 
105 See Randell, supra note 104, at 810. 
106J.E.S. Fawcett, The Eichmann Case, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 181, 182 (1961). 
107Id. 
108Id. 
109 Id. 
11oId. at 182-83. 
III The Knesset is the Israeli Parliament. TEICHOLZ, supra note 12, at 101. 
112 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 25. 
113Fawcett, supra note 106, at 185. 
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This law is fundamentally different in its characteristics, in 
the legal and moral principles underlying it and in its 
spirit, from all other criminal enactments usually found on 
the statute books. The Law is retroactive and extraterrito-
rial and its object inter alia is to provide a basis for the 
punishment of crimes which are not comprised within the 
criminal law of Israel being the special consequence of the 
Nazi regime and its persecution.n4 
151 
Demjanjuk contested Israel's right to prosecute him under the Nazi 
Statute, contending that it was an ex post facto law, and therefore, 
impermissible. ll5 The United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio rejected this argument, stating that the Nazi Statute, 
like the Nuremberg Charter and the Genocide Convention, "did not 
declare unlawful what had been lawful before, rather it provide(d] 
a new forum in which to bring to trial persons for conduct previously 
recognized as criminal."lI6 The court cited international agreements, 
such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which expressly 
forbade the killing of defenseless persons, as determinative of the 
illegality of Demja~uk's conduct at the time committed.ll7 The 
court also noted that by 1942 the operation of gas chambers and 
the torturing of innocent prisoners were illegal acts under the laws 
of every civilized nation. lIB The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court's decision, holding that Israel clearly possessed jurisdiction to 
try Demjanjuk under the Nazi Statute.1!9 
B. jurisdiction Under International Law 
The district court also held that Israel had jurisdiction to try 
Demjanjuk based on the universality principle of international law. 120 
The international community recognizes five basic principles of 
jurisdiction.121 The "territoriality" principle recognizes the right of a 
114Id. at 184, citing Honigmman v. Attorney General [1952] 12 Pesakin 336, INT'L L. REp., 
1951,543. 
115 In re: Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 567. The Nazi Statute, which was passed 
in 1950, declared acts occurring between 1933 and 1945 illegal. See Nazi Statute, supra note 
15, § 16. 
116 In re: Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 567. 
117 ld. 
118Id. 
119 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 581-82. 
120 In re: Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 555. 
121 See Randell, supra note 104, at 787-88; M. C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 
(1986) 4-5 [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW]. 
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state to punish crimes committed within its territory. 122 The "nation-
ality" principle grants jurisdiction when the offender is a national of 
the prosecuting state.123 The "passive personality" principle confers 
jurisdiction when the victim is a national of the prosecuting state.124 
The "protective principle" recognizes jurisdiction where an extrater-
ritorial act threatens the security or a vital interest of the prosecuting 
state.125 Finally, the "universality" principle allows a state to exercise 
jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses recognized by the 
international community to be of international concern.126 
1. The Universality Principle 
The universality principle of international jurisdiction is premised 
on the notion that certain crimes are so universally condemned that 
their perpetrators are enemies of all people.127 Thus, when universal 
jurisdiction is the basis under which a State is proceeding, neither 
the nationality of the accused or the victims, nor the location of the 
crime is relevant.128 Universal jurisdiction gives a State the authority 
to act individually and prosecute a criminal under its own law, rather 
than under the law of the nation where the act was committed.129 
Under the universality principle, a State may enact municipal laws 
which declare illegal crimes against all humanity and empower the 
State's national courts to hear such cases.130 Thus, under interna-
tional law, the Nazi Statute is a proper method to punish crimes 
universally recognized and condemned by the community of nations. 
The idea that perpetrators of crimes against humanity and of war 
crimes could be subject to universal jurisdiction found acceptance 
in the aftermath of World War 11.131 Wartime allies132 created the IMT 
122 BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 121, at 5; Randell, supra note 104, at 788. 
123BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 121, at 5; Randell, supra note 104, at 788. 
124BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 121, at 5; Randell, supra note 104, at 788. 
125 BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 121, at 5 ;Randell, supra note 104, at 788. 
126 See BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 121, at 5; Randell, supra note 104, at 788; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1986) ("A state has jurisdiction 
to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of 
nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircrafts, 
genocide, war crimes and perhaps terrorism ... "). 
127 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 582--83. 
128Id. 
129 Reiss, supra note 6, at 302. 
130Id. 
131 In re: Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 556. Various tribunals were set up after 
World War II to prosecute Nazi war criminals. See id. Most notably, the IMT was set up at 
Nuremberg to try "major" German war criminals. Id. 
132The IMT was created and administered jointly by the United States, Great Britain, 
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to try Nazi officials accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and crimes against peace, most of which were committed outside 
the territory of the four Allies. 133 The IMT's jurisdiction was not 
limited to the sovereign territories, or even the occupied zones; 
rather, it was empowered by its charter to exercise jurisdiction over 
even those offenses that had no "particular geographic location. "134 
The international community affirmed and endorsed the principles 
of law invoked by the tribunals. 13s 
2. The Application of the Universality Principle to the 
Eichmann Trial 
By 1961, it was clear that war crimes and crimes against humanity 
were accepted as crimes of universal jurisdiction.136 In the trial of 
Adolph Eichmann, the Israeli Supreme Court specifically recog-
nized its right to try Nazi war criminals under principles of universal 
jurisdiction.137 The District Court of Jerusalem stated a dual founda-
tion in international law for trying Eichmann: "the universal char-
acter of the crimes in question and their specific character as in-
tended to exterminate the Jewish people. "138 
The Supreme Court of Israel further stated: 
... there is full justification for applying here the principle 
of universal jurisdiction since the international character 
of the 'crimes against humanity' dealt with in this instant 
France, and the Soviet Union, collectively known as the "Allies." Randell, supra note 104, at 
801. The Allies established the IMT through the London Agreement which was assented to 
by nineteen other states. Id., citing The London Agreement, Aug. 8, 1945,59 Stat. 1544. 
1331MT Charter, supra note 102; In reo Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 556-57. 
For a list of the offenses over which the IMT had jurisdiction, see IMT Charter, supra note 
102. 
134 Reiss, supra note 6, at 303. 
135 In reo Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 557. 
136 Reiss, supra note 6, at 304. 
137 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 304 (lsr. Sup. Ct. 1962). The 
Eichmann Court further stated: 
The abhorrent crimes defined in this law are crimes not under Israeli law alone [sic). 
These crimes which affected the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of 
nations are grave offences against the law of nations itself. Therefore, so far from 
international law negating or limiting the jurisdiction of countries with respect to 
such crimes, in the absence of an International Court the international law is in 
need of the judicial and legislative authorities of every country, to give effect to its 
penal injunctions and to bring criminals to trial. The authority and jurisdiction to 
try crimes under international law are universal. 
Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 26 (Isr. Dist. Ct.:Jerusalem 1961). 
138Id. 
154 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVIII, No.1 
case is no longer in doubt .... Not only do the crimes 
attributed to appellant bear an international character, but 
their harmful and murderous effects were so embracing 
and widespread as to shake the international community 
to its very foundations. The State of Israel therefore was 
entitled pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction 
and in the capacity of a guardian of international law and 
an agent for its enforcement, to try the appellant.139 
Thus, after the Eichmann decision, it was clear that Israel would 
assert its right to try Nazi war criminals under the universality prin-
ciple of international law. 
3. Application of the Universality Principle in the Demjanjuk 
Case 
The extradition court in the Demjanjuk case held that Israel's 
assertion of jurisdiction was proper under the universality principle 
of international law.140 The district court cited the IMT at Nurem-
berg and several other international agreements as examples of the 
international community's acceptance of universal jurisdiction over 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.141 In affirming the lower 
court's decision, the Sixth Circuit cited section 404 of the Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which spe-
cifically recognizes the universality principle as a proper means to 
obtain jurisdiction over an individual.142 
Thus, because the international community recognizes the uni-
versality principle as a proper basis for exercising jurisdiction over 
perpetrators of war crimes, and because the law of the United States 
includes international law, the extraterritorial nature of Demjanjuk's 
crimes did not bar extradition.143 Based on these principles, the 
Sixth Circuit rejected Demjanjuk's jurisdictional challenges to the 
139 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 299. 
140 In re: Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 555. 
141Id. at 557. The court cited the Genocide Convention and the United Nations' "Nurem-
berg principles" as examples of post-World War II acceptance of the universality principle. Id. 
at 557-58. The Nuremberg Principles were formulated by the International Law Commission 
of the United Nations at the request of the United Nations General Assembly. Id. at 557. The 
report describes crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as "interna-
tional crimes." Id., citing Report of the International Law Commission, 5 U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., 
Supp. No. 12, 111 U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950). 
142Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 582; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, § 404 (1986). 
143 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 582. 
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district court's extradition order and held that the State oflsrael, as 
the prosecuting nation, had the right to seek the punishment of 
Demjanjuk under principles of international law. 144 On February 28, 
1986, Demjanjuk was extradited to Israel to stand trial for his role 
in Operation Reinhardt. 145 
III. THE 1988 TRIAL 
Criminal Case 373/86, The State of Israel v. Ivan Uohn) De~an­
juk, began on February 16, 1987 before a three judge panel of the 
Jerusalem District Court.146 In the indictment submitted to the dis-
trict court, the State of Israel charged Demjanjuk with the following 
offenses under the Nazi Statute:147 
1) crimes against the Jewish people;148 
2) crimes against humanity;149 
3) war crimes;15o 
4) crimes against persecuted people. 151 
Specifically, the Israeli Government accused De~anjuk of serving 
as an S.S. Wachmann, of perpetrating unspeakable acts of cruelty by 
pushing his victims towards and into the gas chambers at Treblinka, 
144 Id. at 583. The court also noted that Israel may have been able to assert jurisdiction over 
Demjanjuk pursuant to the Nazi Statute based on the protective principle, which recognizes 
jurisdiction where an extraterritorial act threatens the security or a vital interest of the 
prosecuting state. In re: Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 558-59 n.13. The extradi-
tion court noted that it was argued that important state interests of Israel were affected by 
the acts alleged. Id. It was also noted that Israel may have been able to assert jurisdiction over 
Demjanjuk based on the passive personality principle, which confers jurisdiction when the 
victim is a national of the prosecuting state. Id. Although the victims of Ivan the Terrible's 
acts were not Israeli citizens, Israel claimed jurisdiction under this theory based on its close 
nexus with the victims. Id. 
14516-Year Fight, supra note 4. 
146 See THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at xii; 16-Year Fight, supra note 4. 
147 THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 7. 
148 For a definition of "crimes against Jewish people," see supra note 96. 
149 For a definition of "crimes against humanity" under the Nazi Statute, see supra note 97. 
ISO For a definition of "war crimes" under the Nazi Statute, see supra note 98. 
lSI See Nazi Statute, supra note 15, § 2, which states: 
[I] f a person, during the period of the Nazi regime, committed in an enemy country 
an act by which, had he committed it in Israel territory, he would have become guilty 
of an offence under one of the following sections of the Criminal Code, and he 
committed the act against a persecuted person as a persecuted person he shall be 
guilty of an offence under this Law and be liable to the same punishment to which 
he would have been liable had he committed the act in Israel territory: ... (e) 
section 212 (manslaughter); (f) section 214 (murder); (g) section 222 (attempt to 
murder) .... 
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and of beating their naked bodies and cutting pieces from their 
living flesh. 152 Israel also accused Demjanjuk of operating, with his 
own hands, the gas chambers at the Treblinka death camp, thereby 
causing the death of hundreds of thousands of people. 153 The prose-
cution further alleged that Demjanjuk, because of his cruelty, earned 
the nickname "Ivan Grozny" or "Ivan the Terrible. "154 In his response 
to the indictment, Demjanjuk repeated the assertions that he had 
made in his denaturalization and extradition hearings in the United 
States.155 Namely, he contended that he was never a member of the 
auxiliary forces that served the German authorities and he never 
received training in the Trawniki camp, and thus, that the Trawniki 
card was a forgery.156 Demjanjuk also asserted that he was never a 
part of Operation Reinhardt, that he was never at either the Tre-
blinka death camp or the Sobibor extermination camp, and that he 
was not Ivan the Terrible. 157 
In his defense, Demjanjuk contended not only that the prosecu-
tion witnesses were mistaken in their identification, but also that at 
the time that Ivan the Terrible was committing his horrible crimes 
in Treblinka, he, Demjanjuk, was a German prisoner-of-war in Po-
land. 158 According to Demjanjuk, in 1942, during his service in the 
Soviet Army, he was captured by the Germans at the "Battle of 
Kerch. "159 Mter being held for several weeks at temporary camps in 
the Crimean peninsula and Rovno, Demjanjuk claims he was trans-
ferred to the Chelm prisoner-of-war camp in Eastern Poland.160 Ac-
cording to Demjanjuk, he remained at Chelm for about eighteen 
months, where he worked building residential quarters, unloading 
coal, and cutting peat.161 In 1944, after approximately eighteen mon ths, 
Demjanjuk claims he was taken with other prisoners to a place used 
by the National Liberation Army in Austria and later to a camp near 
the Swiss border.162 He further contended that he was attached to 
these forces until the end of the Second World War, after which time 
152THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 6. 
153Id. 
154Id. 
155 Id.; u.s. v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1376-77 (denaturalization hearing); In re: Extra-
dition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 553 (extradition case). 
156THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 7-8. 
157Id. at 8. 
158Id. at 332. 
159Id. 
16°Id. at 333. 
161 THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 333. 
162Id. at 8. 
1995] NOT GUILTY, BUT NOT INNOCENT EITHER 157 
he relocated to a Displaced Persons camp, where he remained until 
he emigrated to the United States.163 
The prosecution relied on two main pieces of evidence to prove 
its case. The first piece consisted of the testimony of five Treblinka 
survivors and one German guard who positively identified Demjan-
juk as Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka.164 Four other Treblinka survi-
vors also identified Demjanjuk's photo to investigators, but they died 
before the trial commenced.165 Further support arose from the iden-
tification of Demjanjuk's photo by a farmer named Dudoc, who 
operated a tavern near the Treblinka death camp.166 Dudoc iden-
tified Demjanjuk's photo as someone known to him as Ivan the 
Terrible, operator of the gas chambers at Treblinka. 167 
The District Court of Jerusalem dealt at length with the question 
of whether or not it is possible to remember and accurately describe 
the details of events that took place over forty-five years ago. 168 Mter 
hearing the testimony of the survivors, the court concluded that it 
was impossible to forget the realities of Treblinka, and that anyone who 
underwent the shock of the Treblinka extermination camp could 
not forget what their eyes had seen.169 The court held that the 
identifications by the survivors were both reliable and accurate. l7O 
The second piece of evidence relied on by the prosecution was 
the "Trawniki document," an S.S. identification card which placed 
Demjanjuk as a member of the Trawniki unit of the German S.S., a 
163Id. at 8-9. 
164Id. at 118. Demjanjuk was positively identified by Otto Horn, a guard who served at the 
Treblinka extermination camp during the years that Ivan the Terrible operated the gas 
chambers. Id. at 162. Horn testified that he was well acquainted with Ivan and saw him 
frequently performing his various duties. Id. at 164. Prior to his testimony, Horn, in succession, 
picked out both Demjanjuk's 1951 visa picture and the Trawniki photograph and identified 
him as the Ivan he knew from Treblinka. Id. at 167. 
165 See Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 8. 
166Id. at 9. 
167Id. 
168THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 10. The district court also, and perhaps more 
importantly, posed the question in the alternative, i.e., is it at all possible to forget? Id. The 
court asked itself: 
!d. 
Can people who were in the vale of slaughter and experienced its horrors ... people 
who saw, day after day, the killing, the humiliation, the brutality, the abuse by the 
German oppressors ... forget all this? .... Is it possible that someone who has 
experienced the terrible reality described in the indictment would remember so well 
the details of the actions while forgetting their perpetrators? 
169Id. at 198. 
170Id. at 263. 
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unit which worked at the Treblinka death camp.l7l The card bears 
Demjanjuk's name and several identifying features, such as his fa-
ther's name, his date of birth, his place of birth, and a photograph 
in S.S. uniform which appeared to be of Demjanjuk.172 The card does 
not mention Demjanjuk's service at Treblinka, but instead lists his 
presence at Sobibor, another Nazi death camp where approximately 
250,000 Jews were put to death.173 The district court rejected Demjan-
juk's claim that the card was a forgery by the secret services of the 
former Soviet Union, the KGB. The court held that the Trawniki 
certificate was authentic and proved Demjanjuk's service at the 
Trawniki camp.174 Demjanjuk's alibi was also disproved by expert 
testimony which established that Chelm was only a transit camp in 
which prisoners remained for no longer than several weeks. 175 
On April 18, 1988, after a fourteen month trial, the Israeli District 
Court found that Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible and convicted 
him on all four counts of the indictment.176 The court based its 
verdict principally on the testimony of the five Treblinka survivors 
and the statements of those survivors who had identified Demjanjuk 
to Israeli police, but had died before the trial began. 177 Although the 
court held that the identifications, in and of themselves, were sufficient 
proof of Demjanjuk's guilt, the court also cited the Trawniki docu-
ment, and Demjanjuk's faulty alibi as reinforcing its holding.178 One 
week later, the court sentenced Demjanjuk to death by hanging. 179 
Demjanjuk remained in solitary confinement in a cell near Tel Aviv 
for five years awaiting a ruling on his appeal,lBO 
IV. THE 1993 APPEAL AND THE ACQUITTAL 
Demjanjuk's appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court began on May 
14, 1990, more than two years after the district court's decision. l8l 
171 THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 265. 
172 [d. 
173 [d. at 325; DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 1, at 149. 
174 THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 265,328. 
175 [d. at 384. 
17616-Year Fight, supra note 4; THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 385. 
177 THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 384. 
178 [d. at 384. 
179 16-Year Fight, supra note 4. 
180 Goller, supra note 13. 
181 TEICHOLZ, supra note 12, at 302. The appeal was originally scheduled for December 1988. 
Id. One week before the appeal was to begin, a member of Demjanjuk's defense team, former 
Israeli District Court Judge Dov Eitan, committed suicide by jumping from the fifteenth floor 
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In his petition, Demjanjuk appealed both the district court's convic-
tion and its sentence.182 Demjanjuk continued to assert that he was 
not Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka. 183 
The prosecution's evidence regarding identification in the Demjan-
juk case consisted of two distinct sets of evidence. 184 The first set 
related to Demjanjuk's service as a Wachmann of the S.S. in the 
Trawniki unit. 18s The second set dealt with his service within that 
unit as an operator of the gas chambers at Treblinka.186 On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Israel allowed Demjanjuk to introduce new 
evidence which called into question his service at Treblinka. 187 
A. The Treblinka Evidence 
The district court based its ruling, which found Demjanjuk guilty 
of being Ivan the Terrible, principally on the testimony and deposi-
tions of the Treblinka survivors.188 The Israeli Supreme Court care-
fully examined the identification procedures and testimony of these 
witnesses to assess their reliability.189 The court found that the pro-
cedures used by Israeli investigators complied with Israeli rules of 
evidence, and the identifications themselves were completely reli-
able.190 The court also dismissed the defense counsel's allegations of 
ofa building in Jerusalem. Id. At Eitan's funeral on December 1, 1988, Yisrael Yehezekeli, a 
Holocaust survivor, threw a solution of hydrochloric acid at Yoram Sheftel, Demjanjuk's 
attorney. Id. at 303. Demjanjuk's appeal was delayed a year to allow Sheftel to recover. Id. 
182 Landau, Free, supra note 11. The appeal filed by Demjanjuk's counsel also contained 
allegations about "the general functioning of the honourable Court of the first instance, 
throughout the trial of the appellant, including its attitude to the parties before it, especially 
everything related to applying different criteria in the extreme towards the prosecution on 
the one hand and the defence on the other." Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 38. The Israeli 
Supreme Court dismissed these allegations as having no substance. See id. 
183 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 21. 
184 [d. at 1. 
185 [d. 
186 [d. 
187Id. at 10. 
188THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at xxv. 
189 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 2-10. In determining the reliability of the identification 
procedures, the court applied the totality of the circumstances test as set forth in Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 111, 199-200 (1972). Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 6. This test requires 
that a court weigh the corrupting influence of any suggestiveness against the ultimate reli-
ability of the identification. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 189. The court should consider the following 
factors: the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' 
degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty 
demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. 
[d. 
190 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 3. 
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senility, deception, and negligible identification capacity against the 
witnesses. 191 Thus, the court found no grounds for interfering with 
the district court's findings based on the survivors' testimony.192 
The identification testimony, however, was not the only piece of 
evidence submitted regarding the identity ofIvan the Terrible.193 In 
1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, new evidence was 
released from Soviet archives which identified another man, Ivan 
Marchenko, as the gas chamber operator known as Ivan the Terri-
ble. 194 The new evidence consisted of "protocols"195 of thirty-seven 
former Treblinka guards and forced laborers, who had been inter-
rogated about their crimes in the former Soviet Union following 
World War II.196 Many of the depositions stated that the name of the 
gas chamber operator known as Ivan the Terrible was Ivan Mar-
chenko.197 Some of these former guards identified Marchenko in 
photographs that bore little resemblance to Demjanjuk.198 
During the appeal, Demjanjuk submitted applications for the 
admission of this new evidence.199 Under Israeli law, the Supreme 
Court has a wide degree of discretion regarding what evidence it 
can review on appeal,2oo For example, section 15 of the Nazi Statute 
allows the court to deviate "from the rules of evidence if it is satisfied 
that this will promote the ascertainment of the truth and the just 
handling of the case."201 On August 14, 1991, pursuant to this sec-
tion, the Israeli Supreme Court accepted the new evidence.202 
To prove its case, the prosecution did not need to prove guilt with 
absolute certainty.203 Rather, it was only necessary to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 204 In determining whether the new evi-
dence created a reasonable doubt, the court first measured the 
191 [d. at 10. 
192 [d. 
193 [d. 
194 [d. at 10-11; Hedges, supra note 1, at AS. 
195Protocols are written summaries, taken by a clerk, stating what a prisoner said under 
interrogation. Interview with Allan A. Ryan, former director of the United States Justice 
Department, Office of Special Investigations, in Boston, Massachusetts Oan. 2S, 1993). 
196 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 14; Goller, supra note 13. 
197 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 11. Marchenko was last seen in Yugoslavia in 1944. Hedges, 
supra note 1, at AS. 
198 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 11. 
199 Landau, Free, supra note 11. 
200TEICHOLZ, supra note 12, at 303. 
201 Nazi Statute, supra note 15, § 15(a); Landau, Free, supra note 11. 
20216-Year Fight, supra note 4. 
203 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 16. 
204 [d. 
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evidentiary weight of the protocols.205 The court recognized the 
inherent difficulty in determining the reliability of the protocols 
given the fact that no evidence regarding the statements, outside of 
the written documents themselves, was submitted to the court.206 The 
court noted, for example, that neither party had submitted any 
evidence regarding the protocols' chain of possession from the time 
they came into existence until the present.207 As a result, it was 
impossible for the court to clarifY anything beyond that which was 
written in the statements.20S 
In order to uphold the district court's conviction, the prosecution 
needed to convince the Israeli Supreme Court that the collection of 
facts put before it was not consistent with any rational conclusion 
other than the one that Demjanjuk, and no other person, was Ivan 
the Terrible of Treblinka.209 The prosecution, however, failed to 
advance any arguments that could reconcile the new evidence with 
the statements of the survivors. 210 Despite the many questions and 
problems surrounding the Russian protocols, without a reasonable 
basis for rejecting the evidence as untrustworthy, the court refused 
to rule out their significance.211 
As the court stated: 
In the circumstances before us the statements submitted at 
the appeal stage prevent [us from] reaching a rational 
conclusion, which is close to certain, about the soundness 
of the appellant's conviction as Ivan the Terrible, operator 
of the gas chambers. In the absence of a rational conclu-
sion ... with regard to the statements there remains a 
deadlock, i.e., a reasonable doubt, and if there is a reason-
able doubt, the appellant is entitled to benefit from it.212 
On July 29, 1993, as a result of this reasonable doubt, the Supreme 
Court of Israel acquitted Demjanjuk on charges of being Ivan the 
Terrible of Treblinka.213 
205Id. at 12. 
206Id. 
207Id. 
208 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 12. 
209Id. at 16. 
210Id. at 18. 
211Id. 
212Id. at 19-20. 
213 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 20. 
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B. Service at the Trawniki Unit and at Sobibor 
Although the new evidence created a reasonable doubt as to 
whether Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible, it in no way refuted the 
evidence of Demjanjuk's service as a Wachmann of the S.S. in the 
Trawniki unit.214 To the contrary, the protocols from Russia included 
a deposition of an S.S. Wachmann named Danilchenko who testified 
that he had served together with Demjanjuk as part of the Trawniki 
unit at the extermination camp at Sobibor.215 Danilchenko identified 
Demjanjuk to the Soviet authorities in three photographic lineups 
containing three different pictures of Demjanjuk.216 The new evi-
dence introduced on appeal also added a detailed description of a 
Wachmann's duties in the Trawniki unit.217 These duties included: 
guarding those condemned to extermination on their way to death 
camps, dealing with their disembarkment from the trains, preparing 
for their extermination, and forcing Jewish prisoners, by threats, 
violence, and murder, to collect the other prisoners' clothes, gather 
up their valuables, and take corpses to buria1.218 Thus, it was clear 
from the factual information presented to the Israeli Supreme Court 
that Demjanjuk was part of the Trawniki unit, a unit whose primary 
purpose was to aid the Nazi administration in the destruction of the 
Jewish people.219 
The court then considered whether it had the authority to convict 
Demjanjuk for crimes committed during his service in the Trawniki 
unit-crimes with which he had not formally been charged.220 The 
court examined this question under both international laws of ex-
tradition and Israeli criminal procedure.221 Both the extradition 
request and the indictment sheet submitted to the United States by 
214 [d. at 19-20. 
215 [d. Sobibor was an extermination camp located in the northeastern part of the Lublin 
district of Poland, one hundred miles south of Treblinka. THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 
2, at 28-29. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services and the Israeli authorities 
originally believed that Demjanjuk had served at Sobibor. See THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra 
note 2, at 129; ALLAN A. RYAN, QUIET NEIGHBORS 104 (1984). It was not until several survivors 
identified Demjanjuk's photo as "Ivan the Terrible" of Treblinka that the Treblinka charges 
were investigated. RYAN, supra, at 107. 
216 See Landau, Free, supra note 11; Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 20. New evidence was also 
presented on appeal that showed Demjanjuk served with the S.S. in the Flossenbeurg and 
Regensbuerg concentration camps. Landau, Free, supra note 11; Final Chapter, supra note 3, 
at 20. 
217 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 20. 
218 [d. at 20-29. 
219 [d. at 25, 32. 
220 [d. at 33. 
221 [d. at 33. 
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Israel discussed Demjanjuk's service in the Trawniki unit.222 Although 
aiding in murder is an extraditable offense under the Extradition 
Treaty,223 the extradition decision by the U.S. District Court ad-
dressed only the charge of murder as part of Demjanjuk's service at 
Treblinka; it did not separately examine the charge of aiding in 
murder as part of his service in the Trawniki unit. 224 Under the 
"principle of specialty," which is encompassed in the Extradition 
Treaty,225 a country requesting the extradition of a person cannot 
prosecute that person for another offense listed in the Treaty, but 
for which extradition was not granted.226 Section 24 of the Extradi-
tion Law of the State of Israel, 5714-1954, encompasses this princi-
ple, providing: 
[W]here a person has been extradited to Israel by a foreign 
state, he shall not be detained or tried for another offence, 
or extradited to another state for any offence, committed 
before his extradition, unless that foreign state consents in 
writing to such an act or he has not left Israel within sixty 
days after being given an opportunity-subsequent to his 
extradition-so to do or he left Israel after his extradition 
and has voluntarily returned to it.227 
222 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 32. The indictment described the overall objectives of the 
Trawniki unit and Demjanjuk's membership in this unit. Id. 
223 Extradition Treaty, supra note 69, art. II, 14 U .S.T. at 1708, 1709. 
224 In re: Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 560. Demjanjuk was extradited for the 
charge of murder pursuant to article II of the Treaty. Id.; Extradition Treaty, supra note 69, 
art. II, 14 U.S.T. at 1708. 
225 See Extradition Treaty, supra note 69, art. III, 14 U.S.T. at 1712, which states: 
[A] person extradited under the present Convention shall not be detained, tried or 
punished in the territory of the requesting Party for any offense other than that for 
which extradition has been granted nor be extradited by that Party to a third State 
unless: 
1. He has left the territory of the requesting Party after his extradition and has 
voluntarily returned to it; 
2. He has not left the territory of the requesting Party within 60 days after being free 
to do so; or 
3. The requested Party has consented to his detention, trial, punishment or extradi-
tion to a third State for an offense other than that for which extradition was granted. 
226BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 85, at 352-53; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS, § 477 (1986) regarding the doctrine of specialty, which states, in relevant 
part: "Under most international agreements ... (1) A person who has been extradited to 
another state will not, unless the requested state consents, (a) be tried by the requesting state 
for an offense other than one for which he was extradited .... " Id. 
227 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 33-34, quoting § 24 of the Extradition Law of the State of 
Israel. 
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The Israeli Supreme Court interpreted the principle of specialty as 
mandating two requirements in order to convict Demjanjuk of aid-
ing in murder as a member of the Trawniki unit. 228 The first condi-
tion, which is implied from the laws of extradition, requires that the 
new charge-aiding in murder-be an extraditable offense under 
the Extradition Treaty.229 The last paragraph of section II of the 
U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty, in which the list of extraditable 
offenses appears, states that extradition shall also be granted for 
participation in any of the offenses mentioned in the article.230 
Because murder is an extraditable offense under the Extradition 
Treaty, the court concluded that aiding in murder is an extraditable 
offense as well.231 
The second condition of the principle of specialty relates to the 
issue of what constitutes another offense under section 24 ofIsraeli 
law; that is, "whether and when can the alternative offence be con-
sidered an offence of which the accused was indicted ab initio since 
it was included within the indictment or was an element thereof."232 
Although the prosecution made no attempt to obtain from the 
United States an alternative indictment relating to the Trawniki 
charges, this fact did not prevent the Israeli court from convicting 
Demjanjuk on these charges.233 The key inquiry was whether the 
Trawniki charges constituted the same or another offense under the 
indictment.234 That is, if the facts supporting the original request for 
Demjanjuk's extradition also supported the Trawniki charges, the 
Israeli Supreme Court properly could retain jurisdiction over Demjan-
juk without violating the principle of specialty.235 If, however, the 
Trawniki charges were found to constitute another offense, the 
court would not have jurisdiction to convict Demjanjuk.236 The Su-
preme Court of Israel never addressed the question of whether the 
principle of specialty would be violated by convicting Demjanjuk on 
the Trawniki or Sobibor charges.237 Instead, the court based its decision 
228Id. at 34. 
229Id. at 35. 
230 See Extradition Treaty, supra note 69, art .11, 14 U.S.T. at 1709. 
231 See id.; see also Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 35. 
232 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 35. 
233Id. 
234 See id. 
235 See BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 85, at 357-58. 
236 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 35. 
237Id. at 38. 
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not to convict Demjanjuk of the Trawniki charges on principles of 
Israeli law. 238 
Under section 216 of the Israeli Criminal Procedure Law (Con-
solidated Version) of 1982, an Israeli court may convict the accused 
when the facts prove that he is guilty of an offense, even though 
those facts are not alleged in the indictment, provided that the 
defendant has been given a "reasonable opportunity to defend him-
self. "239 A reasonable opportunity to defend oneself includes both 
a technical-procedural element and a fundamental-substantive ele-
ment.240 
The procedural element dictates that the "defendant ha[s] the 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to bring evidence of his own 
and to manage the defense as he desires."241 The substantive element 
relates to the objective ability of the defendant to prepare against 
an indictment that has language different from the one originally 
filed, and to organize the pleading and the defense strategy com-
pletely, without being subject to any surprises.242 In the case before 
the district court, the prosecution presented evidence of Demjan-
juk's service in the Trawniki unit as part of the factual information 
surrounding Demjanjuk's training in the S.S.243 His service in the 
Trawniki unit also was alleged in the extradition application.244 In 
addition, the prosecution relied on the Trawniki card to prove 
Demjanjuk's service in the S.S.245 Throughout all levels of his legal 
battle, Demjanjuk not only tried to prove that he was not Ivan the 
Terrible, but also persistently refuted any connection between him-
self and the German S.S.246 For example, Demjanjuk repeatedly 
238Id. at 38-9. 
239Id. at 36, citing Criminal Procedure Law [Consolidated Version], 5742-1982. The law 
also states that the court may not impose a heavier penalty than could have been imposed if 
the facts alleged in the indictment had been proven. Id. 
240Id., citing Criminal Appeal 63, 76/79 Ozer v. State ofIsrael, Supreme Court Judgments, 
33 (3) 606, 615. 
241Id. 
242 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 36, citing Criminal Appeal 242/63, Kariti v. Attorney 
General, Supreme Court Judgments 18 (3) 477 (Isr.); Criminal Appeal 428/74, Dadash v 
Municipality of Jerusalem, Supreme Court Judgments 29 (2) 23 (Isr.). 
243Id. at 32. 
244Id. 
245 See id. at 1. 
246Id. at 21, 39. Demjanjuk brought in expert witnesses who attempted to prove that the 
Trawniki card was forged by the KGB. THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 275. Demjan-
juk's alibi defense attempted to refute allegations of both his training at Trawniki and his 
service at Treblinka. Id. at 334. 
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denied that he was ever at the Trawniki training camp.247 To prove 
this, he maintained that the Trawniki card was forged by the KGB.248 
As part of his defense, expert witnesses were retained to testifY that 
the Trawniki card was not authentic. 249 Demjanjuk also tried to 
convince the court that the statements of Danilchenko, an S.S. guard 
who claimed he served with Demjanjuk at Sobibor, were forged. 250 
The focus of the government's case in both the United States and 
in Israel, however, had been Demjanjuk's service at the Treblinka 
death camp in Poland.251 The identifications central to the Israeli 
District Court's decision related to a Wachmann known as Ivan the 
Terrible at the Treblinka camp.252 At the trial before the district 
court, the prosecution never advanced the charge of aiding in mur-
der as a result of Demjanjuk's service in the Trawniki unit.253 Instead, 
the charge arose at trial before the Supreme Court of Israel, during 
the examination of the new evidence.254 Similarly, the charges relat-
ing to Demjanjuk's service at Sobibor were not central to the lower 
court's proceedings.255 For these reasons, the court held that Dem-
janjuk did not have a reasonable opportunity to defend himself 
against the Trawniki charges.256 The court stated: 
[H) aving a reasonable opportunity to defend would mean 
today, de facto, starting the proceedings again, i.e. further 
continuation of the proceedings beyond the proper meas-
ure. Such a change in the line of attack in everything 
relating to the substance of the indictment seven years and 
more after the proceedings began does not seem to us 
reasonable, considering the severe nature of the first in-
dictment which served as the basis for the extradition, and 
that is so even if we take into account the severe substance, 
nature and circumstances of an alternative indictment .... 257 
247Id. 
248 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 21; THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 265. 
249 THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 268. 
250 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 39. 
251Id. 
252Id. 
253 !d. 
254Id. 
255 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 39. 
256Id. 
257Id. 
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Thus, the court declined to use its authority under section 216 to 
convict Demjanjuk. 258 
An the underlying assumptions in Israeli criminal law is that a 
court must operate within strict constraints to assure absolute reli-
ability in the determination of guilt, and that the accused should be 
given every opportunity to exonerate himself.259 As the Supreme 
Court of Israel stated in the Demjanjuk case, "where there is a 
shadow of suspicion that the accused has been deprived of his right 
and his possibility of defending himself properly against a new 
indictment, or where this has been diminished to an unreasonable 
degree, the Court shall not exercise its authority under ... section 
216."260 
Jewish law embodies the view that the proper function of the court 
is not to determine the absolute truth, but to lift the cloud of guilt 
from the accused. 261 This philosophy is revealed in the final sen-
tences of the Israeli Supreme Court's ruling: 
The main issue of the indictment sheet filed against the 
appellant was his identification as Ivan the Terrible, an 
operator of the gas chambers in the extermination camp 
in Treblinka. A substantial number of survivors of the Tre-
blinka inferno identified the appellant as Ivan the Terrible 
of Treblinka, one of the chief murderers and tormentors 
of the Jews who were brought to Treblinka on their way to 
suffocation in the gas chambers. He was therefore con-
victed in the district court. Before us, after the hearing of 
the appeal ended, there were submitted statements ofvari-
ous Wachmanner, which spoke of someone else as Ivan the 
Terrible of Treblinka. We do not know how these state-
ments came into the world or who gave birth to them; but 
we admitted them by the most lenient application of the 
law and procedure. And when they came before us doubt 
began to gnaw away at our judicial conscience; perhaps the 
appellant was not Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka. By virtue 
of this knawing-whose nature we knew, but not the mean-
258Id. at 40. 
259 See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Guilt: Henry Friendly Meets the Ma-
HaHaL of Prague, 90 MICH. L. REv. 604, 614, 617 (1991). 
260 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 37-38. 
261 See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 259, at 620; see also Alex Kozinski, Sanhedrin II: 
The Case of Ivan Demjanjuk, THE NEW REpUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
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ing-we restrained ourselves from convicting the appellant 
of the horrors of Treblinka. 
Wachmann Ivan Demjanjuk has been acquitted by us, 
because of doubt, of the terrible charges attributed to Ivan 
the Terrible of Treblinka. This was the proper course for 
judges who cannot examine the heart and the mind, but 
have only what their eyes see and read. The matter is 
closed-but not complete. The complete truth is not the 
prerogative of the human judge. 262 
C. Israel's Decision Not to Retry Demjanjuk 
Following the Supreme Court'sJuly 29th ruling, a group of Holo-
caust survivors and others filed petitions to the Supreme Court of 
Israel demanding new criminal proceedings against Demjanjuk based 
on the Trawniki and Sobibor evidence.263 The Attorney General of 
Israel rejected these petitions, choosing not to pursue new war 
crimes charges against Demjanjuk.264 In an opinion submitted on 
August 11, 1993, the Attorney General offered four reasons for this 
decision: (1) trying Demjanjuk on these charges could constitute a 
case of double jeopardy. Demjanjuk's service at both Trawniki and 
Sobibor had been featured in the evidence, and the prosecution had 
even requested his conviction on these charges; (2) trying Demjan-
juk on these new charges might violate the specialty clause in the 
U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty, because Demjanjuk was extradited 
to Israel pursuant to charges of being Ivan the Terrible, and, there-
fore, the Attorney General stated that trying him on new charges 
might violate principles of international law;265 (3) the Supreme 
Court's judgment itself characterized any further proceedings against 
Demjanjuk as unreasonable, and the Attorney General emphasized 
his obligation to pay proper regard to the comments of the Supreme 
Court; and (4) trying Demjanjuk on new charges was not in the 
public interest as it may well result in another acquittal after a 
protracted, complex proceeding. In the opinion of the Attorney 
General, the chances of securing a conviction in a new trial were 
262 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 40-41. 
263 Haberman, Stays in Jail, supra note 20. 
264 [d. 
265 See discussion supra part IV.B, regarding the Israeli Supreme Court's analysis of the 
specialty clause and its application to the Demjanjuk case. The Attorney General stated that 
the doctrine of specialty was not a "main" consideration in his decision not to prosecute 
Demjanjuk. Landau, The End, supra note 22. 
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slim, and a second acquittal may have a negative effect on bringing 
other Nazi criminals to justice.266 
The Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, 
exercised judicial review of the Attorney General's decision.267 The 
court stated that it would intervene only if it found that the Attorney 
General's grounds for not pursuing the charges were plainly wrong.268 
In the court's opinion, the decision not to try Demjanjuk on the 
new charges clearly fell within the bounds of the Attorney General's 
legitimate discretion, and the petitioners had advanced no adequate 
grounds for the court to intervene.269 Therefore, the petitions were 
dismissed and Demjanjuk was released.270 
V. SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Following Demjanjuk's acquittal by the Israeli Supreme Court, the 
United States District Court for the Sixth Circuit reopened Demjan-
juk's extradition case.271 The issue before the court was whether the 
integrity of the judicial process had been violated in the earlier 
proceedings and if so, whether Demjanjuk's extradition order should 
be set aside.272 Specifically, the question before the court was whether 
the attorneys in the Justice Department's Office of Special Investi-
gations (OSI) had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by failing 
to disclose, to the court and to Demjanjuk, exculpatory information 
in their possession.273 
While this matter was pending, the Sixth Circuit issued a writ of 
habeas corpus ordering the U.S. government to allow Demjanjuk to 
return to the United States.274 This marked the first time ever that 
a convicted Nazi war criminal ejected from the United States was 
permitted to return.275 The court's decision to issue a writ of habeas 
corpus was based on four factors: (1) Demjanjuk's physical pres-
ence in the United States was needed to help prepare his case; (2) 
266 Landau, The End, supra note 22. 
267 [d. 
268 !d. 
269 [d. 
270 [d. 
271 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20596, at *1. 
272 [d. Under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an extradition order 
should be set aside if it was procured by a fraud practiced on the court or if it would be 
otherwise inequitable or unjust to leave the order in effect. See FED. R. Cry. P. 60(b). 
273 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d at 339. 
274 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20596, at *1. 
275 Labaton, supra note 24, at A18. 
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Demjanjuk's life might be in jeopardy by remaining in Israel; (3) 
Demjanjuk's presence might be required for direct testimony in 
review of his extradition order; and (4) basic humanitarian concerns 
required that Demjanjuk be allowed back into the United States.276 
The principal basis for Demjanjuk's claim of prosecutorial mis-
conduct related to undisclosed documents which OSI attorneys had 
received from the former Soviet Union and from Poland.277 These 
documents related to the identity of Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka.278 
The Israeli Supreme Court's decision to acquit Demjanjuk was based 
primarily on statements which became available in 1991, after the 
break-up of the Soviet Union.279 Thus, although it was not contended 
that the OSI possessed these documents during its investigation, 
Demjanjuk maintained that prior to the denaturalization trial the 
OSI had obtained material that should have raised doubts about 
Demjanjuk's identity as Ivan the Terrible.280 
On November 17, 1993, the Sixth Circuit released its opinion, 
holding that the OSI had committed prosecutorial misconduct by 
withholding exculpatory information that Demjanjuk might have 
used to contest his extradition order.281 As a result of this finding, 
the court revoked the extradition order which had sent Demjanjuk 
to Israel in 1986.282 On October 3, 1994, the Supreme Court of the 
United States denied review of the Sixth Circuit's decision.283 
V. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT'S DECISION & ITS IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF NAZI WAR 
CRIMES TRIALS 
The Israeli Supreme Court's decision in the Demjanjuk case rests 
on two key rulings. The first concerns the sufficiency of the evidence 
that Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible, the operator of the gas cham-
bers at the Treblinka death camp in Poland.284 According to the 
court, this charge was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.285 The 
second deals with the lesser charges of aiding in murder as part of 
276 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20596 at *1-2; see also Hertzberg, supra 
note 25, at 181. 
277 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d at 342. 
278 [d. 
279 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 10-11. 
280 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d at 342. 
281 [d. at 356; see also Hertzberg, supra note 25, at 181 n.2. 
282 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d at 356. 
283 Arnold, supra note 26, at A14. 
284 See Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 1; Kozinski, supra note 261. 
285 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 19-20. 
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the Trawniki unit, and service at the extermination camp at Sobibor 
and the concentration camps at Flossenbuerg and Regensbuerg. 286 
These charges were proven to be factually certain.287 
A. The Treblinka Charges 
The Supreme Court of Israel found that a reasonable doubt ex-
isted as to Demjanjuk's identity as Ivan the Terrible.288 The court 
reached this decision despite the testimony of five Treblinka survi-
vors and an S.S. guard who positively identified Demjanjuk as the 
man they knew as Ivan the Terrible.289 In the proceedings before the 
Jerusalem District Court, each of these witnesses identified Demjan-
juk with absolute certainty as the gas chamber operator at the Tre-
blinka death camp.290 Statements of three other survivors, who iden-
tified Demjanjuk to Israeli investigators but did not appear in court, 
supported these in-court identifications.29! 
During the out-of-court identification procedures, each witness 
was shown photographic displays of suspected Nazi war criminals 
from which they picked out Demjanjuk's 1951 visa photo.292 These 
witnesses had lived and worked near Ivan the Terrible for an ex-
tended period of time.293 Many of them suffered directly from his 
abuse. 294 The five Treblinka survivors who testified in court insisted 
that the photograph of Demjanjuk was that of Ivan the Terrible of 
Treblinka.295 These witnesses provided the core of the testimony 
relating to the Treblinka charges.296 The Supreme Court of Israel 
carefully analyzed these identifications and found no grounds to 
question their reliability.297 
The court found the reliability of the new evidence, on the other 
hand, to be extremely suspect.298 The evidence consisted largely of 
286Id. at 20; see also Kozinski, supra note 261. 
287 See Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 21. 
288Id. 
289 !d. at 19-20. 
290Id. at 6. 
291Id. at 8. These statements were admitted under § 15 of the Nazi Statute. See Landau, Free, 
supra note II. 
292WILLEM ALBERT WAGANEER, IDENTIFYING IVAN 95 (1988). Each witness was shown a 
photo display containing at least eight pictures. See THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 
206. 
293 See Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 6. 
294 See THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL, supra note 2, at 80-88. 
295 See Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 6. 
296 [d. 
297 [d. at 10. 
298 See id. at 12. 
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the hearsay statements of dead Nazi collaborators.299 These collabo-
rators, at the time, were being questioned about their own wartime 
activities.30o Most of the Nazi guards interrogated tried to de-empha-
size their personal role in the acts of extermination and many, 
initially, denied their very service in the Trawniki unit.30] Moreover, 
the new evidence did not consist of direct statements by the guards, 
but rather were summaries, written by a Soviet clerk, of what the 
prisoners said while being interrogated.302 Adding to the unreliabil-
ity of the statements was the complete absence of any evidence 
regarding the persons who took the statements, the circumstances 
under which they were taken, or the methods by which they were 
obtained.303 In addition, the statements in question were taken by 
the KGB, an organization which is not known for adhering to west-
ern notions of procedural regularity.304 In sum, nothing was pre-
sented to the court which could clarify the reliability and authentic-
ity of the documents. 
Although the Israeli Supreme Court recognized the many prob-
lems surrounding the Russian evidence, it admitted the protocols, 
and acquitted Demjanjuk based on the reasonable doubt created by 
them.305 The court's willingness to admit these statements, despite 
their inherent unreliability, highlights the basic principles of Israeli 
law, which places the rights of the accused above all else.306 What the 
Israeli Court demanded-and could not find-was "an additional 
layer of evidence"; something which would reconcile the statements 
from the KGB files with the statements of the Treblinka survivors.307 
The court insisted that the prosecution produce a concrete, rational 
explanation to dissipate the doubt created by the new evidence.308 
The prosecution had no way of refuting these statements because it 
had not had the opportunity to cross examine the declarants. In 
addition, the prosecution could not attack the reliability of the 
299 Id. at 10-11. 
300 See Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 14. 
301 Id. at 15. 
302 Interview with Allan A. Ryan, former Director of the United States Justice Department, 
Office of Special Investigations, in Boston, Massachusetts (Jan. 28, 1993). 
303 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 12. 
304 Kozinski, supra note 261; see generally Borys Y. Dackiw, Note, Denaturalization of Suspected 
Nazi War Criminals: The Problem of Soviet-Source Evidence, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 365 
(1986) . 
305 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 40-41. 
306 See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 259, at 615-17. 
307 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 19. 
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statements because the circumstances surrounding the existence of 
the documents were unknown.309 Thus, the very factors which made 
the statements inherently unreliable also made them immune to 
attack.310 
The Israeli Supreme Court's insistence that the prosecution pro-
duce with "an additional layer of evidence" to refute the Soviet 
statements is a much more rigorous standard than that required by 
American law. Where there is newly discovered evidence, an Ameri-
can court places the burden on the defendant to prove that the new 
evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal at trial.311 In deter-
mining whether the defense has met its burden, the court evaluates 
the new evidence in light of the entire record made at trial.312 The 
strength of the evidence presented at trial is an important consid-
eration in the court's evaluation.313 If the court thinks that there is 
a reasonable probability of acquittal a new trial will be ordered.314 
The Israeli Supreme Court should have done what appellate courts 
in the United States do when faced with new evidence-remand the 
case back to the trial court for further proceedings. The district 
court had heard all of the testimony in the 1988 trial; it had wit-
nessed the testimony of the survivors and observed the cross exami-
nations.315 Thus, the district court was in a better position to examine 
the new evidence and make findings of fact. 
The Supreme Court of Israel, however, chose to make its own 
findings of fact based on the new evidence and the record, and to 
acquit Demjanjuk. This decision may have been based on the tradi-
tion of Israeli law, which views the function of a court as removing 
the cloud of guilt from the accused, not determining the absolute 
truth.316 This tradition is revealed most clearly in the last line of the 
Israeli Supreme Court's opinion: "The matter is closed-but not 
complete. The complete truth is not the prerogative of the human 
judge."317 
309 Id. at 12. 
310 See Kozinski, supra note 261. 
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B. The Trawniki and Sobibor Charges 
While the new evidence created a doubt that Demjanjuk was Ivan 
the Terrible, it left no doubt of Demjanjuk's service as a Nazi Wach-
mann in the Trawniki unit.318 The "Trawniki card," the statements 
of Danilchenko, and various other documents submitted on appeal 
proved these charges with absolute certainty.319 The Israeli Supreme 
Court declined, however, to convict Demjanjuk on this charge. 320 
The court reasoned that, because the trial before the lower court 
had dealt primarily with the Ivan the Terrible charge, and the Trawniki 
evidence was only part of background information, Demjanjuk did 
not have a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the 
Trawniki charges.321 Giving Demjanjuk that opportunity, reasoned 
the court, would mean instituting new proceedings.322 The court 
advised that "such a change in the line of the attack in everything 
relating to the substance of the indictment seven years and more 
after the proceedings began does not seem to us reasonable. "323 
Finding this unreasonable, the court declined to use its authority 
under section 216 of the Criminal Procedure Laws of Israel to 
convict Demjanjuk of the Trawniki charge.324 
The court's decision to free Demjanjuk, a man who was shown to 
be an accessory to the mass extermination of millions of Jews, is 
perplexing. While this decision would have been understandable if 
the court had ruled that Demjanjuk should not be tried because 
human memory cannot be trusted to go back that far, the court 
clearly considered the testimony of the eyewitnesses reliable.325 Al-
though the court cited the unreasonableness of new proceedings as 
the basis for its holding, it is doubtful that this factor was controlling 
in the judges' ultimate decision. Demjanjuk's trial in Israel had 
already lasted for seven years, and it is unlikely that a few years 
beyond that would have made any significant difference. Moreover, 
one of the reasons that the trial had been prolonged was the nu-
318 See id. at 21. 
319Id. at 20. 
32°Id. at 40-41. 
321Id. at 39. 
322Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 39. 
323Id. 
324Id. at 36. Under § 216, an Israeli court may convict the defendant of a crime of which 
he is shown to be guilty, even if the charge was not alleged in the complaint. Id. 
325Id. at 10. 
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merous postponements requested by the defense.326 It is hard to 
believe that a few years beyond the many that had already passed 
could be characterized as so unreasonable as to prevent prosecuting 
a known Nazi collaborator. 
It is also unlikely that the decision not to convict Demjanjuk on 
the Trawniki charges was based on a possible violation of the spe-
cialty principle of international law.327 The Israeli Supreme Court 
discussed this principle in its decision, but never ruled on it, basing 
its decision, instead, on the unreasonableness of new proceedings.328 
The Attorney General ofIsrael, however, cited the specialty principle 
in his decision not to bring new charges against Demjanjuk.329 The 
rule of specialty states that a requesting nation only can prosecute 
an extradited defendant for the crime for which that person was 
certified for in the extradition order.330 For example, because the 
United States only certified Demjanjuk's extradition on the Ivan the 
Terrible charges, Israel did not have jurisdiction to try Demjanjuk 
on the Trawniki charges. If Israel seriously had wanted to pursue the 
Trawniki charges, however, it is unlikely that the principle of spe-
cialty would have stood in its way. The United States could have 
granted a ''waiver'' of the rule of specialty based on a formal request 
from IsraeP3! These waivers are routinely granted when the original 
record contains probable cause evidence supporting the additional 
charge.332 Evidence of Demjanjuk's service at Trawniki was submitted 
to the United States extradition court and, thus, the probable cause 
requirement clearly was met. 
The court's decision not to convict Demjanjuk on the Trawniki 
charges may have been based on its feeling that the eyes of the world 
were on it and on IsraeJ.333 As a member of the Trawniki unit, 
Demjanjuk was just one of the many thousands who served as con-
centration camp guards during the Holocaust.334 The court may have 
felt that singling Demjanjuk out, after he had been exonerated of 
the higher charges, would appear petty or vindictive. 
326 Final Chapter, supra note 3, at 39-40. The court stated that the reason for the delay was 
not relevant, it only mattered that there had been such a long delay. Id. at 40. 
327Id. at 34-35. 
328Id. at 38-39. 
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330BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 121, at 423. 
331Id. 
332Id. 
333 See Kozinski, supra note 261. 
334Id. 
176 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVIII, No.1 
The court's decision not to convict Demjanjuk, and the subsequent 
decision by the Israeli government not to bring new charges against 
him, may also have reflected the opinion of many Israelis that, 
whatever the truth about Demjanjuk's guilt or innocence, they wished 
to finally rid themselves of this difficult case. In 1987, when the 
De~anjuk trial began, lawyers and scholars believed that the trial 
would teach a new generation of Israelis about the horrors of the 
Holocaust. 335 The trial was broadcast daily on the radio, and students 
and soldiers were taken on field trips to watch the trial. 336 Mter more 
than seven years, however, the Demjanjuk trial had produced a 
mixture of pain, embarrassment, and perplexity among the Israeli 
people.337 In the end, the court's decision to free Demjanjuk may 
have rested on the view articulated by the Attorney General-that a 
new trial was unwarranted in the public interest.338 
c. Fewer War Crimes Trials as a Result of the Demjanjuk Decision 
The trial of John Demjanjuk may well mark the last major trial of 
a suspected Nazi war criminal. The decision is likely to increase the 
reluctance of nations to seek the extradition of suspected war crimi-
nals. The United States Justice Department's Office of Special Inves-
tigations currently has twenty lawsuits pending against war criminals 
living in the United States and between four hundred and five 
hundred more under investigation.339 Under current U.S. law, Nazi 
war criminals present in the United States cannot be criminally 
prosecuted.340 The United States can only strip Nazi war criminals 
of their U.S. citizenship and deport them, if a country is willing to 
accept them, or extradite them to another country to stand trial.341 
In order for the U.S. to extradite a suspected war criminal, however, 
another nation must be willing to prosecute the criminaP42 Very few 
335 Carol Rosenberg, Demjanjuk Ruling Worries Nazi Hunters: Other Suspects May Avoid Tria~ 
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341Id. at 274-75. 
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nations are willing to seek the extradition of alleged Nazi war crimi-
nals. 343 For example [formerly West] Germany, the State that has the 
clearest jurisdiction to try Nazi criminals,344 has been reluctant to do 
SO.345 Forty-eight cases of suspected Nazi criminals were pending in 
Germany in the mid-seventies.346 It was reported that these cases 
were no longer being actively pursued by German prosecutors be-
cause the German government felt that the Nazi crimes committed 
during World War II were a "thing of the past. "347 Germany is also 
reluctant to seek the extradition of Nazi war criminals because many 
of the alleged criminals, like Demjanjuk, were not German citizens 
at the time they committed the atrocities. 348 Therefore, many Ger-
mans feel it is not their obligation to try these criminals.349 
Mter Demjanjuk's acquittal, it is unlikely that members of the 
international community will be willing to expend the time and 
money it takes to put a war criminal on tria1.350 Unfortunately, this 
reluctance comes at a time when access to previously sealed infor-
mation about Nazi war criminals is more abundant than ever.351 With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of Soviet archives, 
detailed records of Nazi atrocities are now available. 352 
Reluctance to pursue Nazi criminals also may be felt by survivors 
who will be unwilling to expose themselves in the future by recount-
ing the horrors of their past.353 As survivor Josef Czarny said just 
moments after the Demjanjuk verdict came down: "[H]ad I known 
343Id. 
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that such a thing would happen, I would not [have] taken [it] upon 
myself to stand up that day in court and relive Treblinka."354 Unfor-
tunately, in the aftermath of the De~anjuk verdict, this sentiment 
may be echoed by many survivors. 
CONCLUSION 
The acquittal of John Demjanjuk by the Israeli Supreme Court 
will no doubt have a tremendous impact on the future of Nazi war 
crimes trials. The acquittal of Demjanjuk on the charge of being 
Ivan the Terrible calls into doubt the reliability of Holocaust survi-
vors' testimony and supports those who believe the time has come 
to stop the search for Nazi war criminals. Israel's decision not to 
prosecute Demjanjuk on the Trawniki charges raises questions about 
the international community's duty to prosecute perpetrators of war 
crimes. In the end, the lesson of the Demjanjuk case may be that it 
is extraordinarily difficult to bring to justice the perpetrators of the 
Holocaust. The international community'S responsibility to try Nazi 
war criminals is as great as it ever was. The passage of fifty years is 
not long enough to justifY abandoning the pursuit of Nazi war 
criminals, as the passage of time is irrelevant to determining one's 
criminal or moral responsibility. As long as the perpetrators are still 
alive, the international community's responsibility to try them for 
their crimes remains. This duty exists not only to punish the crimi-
nals for the atrocities they committed but also to send a message 
that the international community will not tolerate these types of 
crimes in the future. As Justice Robert Jackson said in his opening 
statement at the Nuremberg Trials in Germany: "[T]he wrongs 
which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so 
malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their 
being ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated. "355 
As for De~anjuk, as of this writing he is reunited with his family 
and living in Ohio. The Justice Department is continuing its fight 
to have Demjanjuk deported based on the Trawniki charges. 
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